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Abstract: Multiscale resilience, i.e., coordinating different scales within a system to jointly cope and
mitigate risks on any single scale, is identified as the feature of a complex resilient system. However,
in water distribution systems (WDSs) and urban drainage systems (UDSs), the inherent resilience is
usually not multiscale resilience. By referring to the larger scale to larger pipes serving both local
users and some other users at smaller scales, it can be found that smaller scales are not responsible for
providing resilience to cope with failures in larger scales. These are because the main function of
traditional water systems is to deliver water from upstream to downstream. This study demonstrates
that improving multiscale resilience in WDSs and UDSs needs to allow water to travel reversely in
the system via providing extra capacities and/or connections at smaller scales. This hypothesis is
verified via case studies on a real world WDS and UDS.
Keywords: resilience; multiscale structure; water distribution systems; drainage
systems; interventions
1. Introduction
Multiscale resilience, i.e., coordinating different scales within a system to jointly cope and mitigate
risks on any single scale (Figure 1), is identified as the feature of a complex resilient system [1]. This
is based on viewing the complex systems as a number of hierarchically interconnected subsystems,
and each hierarchy level refers to a scale (Figure 1). However, both the multiscale structure and the
corresponding resilience are still at the conceptual stage. Accordingly, this study explores how to apply
the concept of multiscale resilience in water distribution systems (WDSs) and urban drainage systems
(UDSs). More specifically it will:
• Reveal the inherent resilience in WDSs and UDSs is monoscale resilience rather than
multiscale resilience;
• Provide a practical view of multiscale resilience in WDSs and UDSs;
• Provide methods for building multiscale resilience in both systems;
• Provide verifications based on case studies on a real-world WDS and UDS.
This study aims to provide a new angle to look at the WDS and UDS resilience and ensure
more comprehensive analysis of the resilience and will support water industry’s move towards smart
networks for improved resilience. Further, the thinking and methodology from this study will be
transferable to contribute to develop methods and tools for the analysis of other complex systems,
particularly other infrastructure systems such as power grids, transport systems, etc.
This paper is organized as follows. The rest part of this section is to first discuss the monoscale
nature of the WDS and UDS resilience, followed by a literature review of the most relevant studies on
resilience enhancement in both WDSs and UDSs. In Section 2—Materials and Methods, two methods
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for improving multiscale resilience are introduced and tested. The method of extra capacity provision
is applied to UDSs (Section 2.1) and the method of providing extra connections is applied to WDSs
(Section 2.2), respectively. After that, the results are presented and discussed in Section 3, followed
with the Conclusions.
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failure without affecting consumer services [23–28]. For example, Mugume et al. 2015b [29] provided a
resilient design that can cope with any single pipe failure with a slight increase (2%) in the capital cost.
The other focus is on using multiobjective evolutionary algorithm for trading off cost and the resilience
index [22,30–32]. For UDSs, Mugume et al. 2015a [11] compared resilience of two alternative designs,
i.e., centralized storage (using one big storage tank at a certain location in the UDS) and upstream
distributed storages (using a number of smaller storage tanks at different locations in the UDS), and
found that the distributed storage can improve UDS resilience to flooding. A few other researchers
recently confirmed the effectiveness of using looped topology to improve UDSs’ resilience to urban
flooding, e.g., in blockage scenarios [33], in hydrodynamic modeling-based design [34], and in eight
subnetworks of the city of Dresden that have different characteristics in terms of capacity as well as
structure [35]. However, the multiscale resilience has not yet been explored explicitly.
2. Materials and Methods
To develop multiscale resilience, however, it requires bi-directional coordination among scales,
i.e., to enable the smaller scales to support the larger scales too. This needs allowing water to travel
reversely in the system (i.e., from larger scales to smaller scales in UDSs and vice versa in WDSs) via
providing extra capacities and/or connections at smaller scales. To test the hypothesis, methods were
developed and tested on a real world WDS and UDS respectively.
2.1. Provision of Extra Capacity
As for providing extra capacity, the idea tested was to enlarge smaller upstream pipes in a UDS
to provide buffer capacities that can accommodate excess water traveling back from downstream
pipes due to surcharge and backwater effects (Figure 2). This is different from traditional design, in
which surcharge and backwater effects are not allowed. The buffer capacity actually plays the role as
a temporary storage, which gives an additional function to the pipes other than just being used to
deliver water to downstream.
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2.1.1. Methodology of Provision of Extra Capacity
• Network Decomposition Based on the “Sewer Branch Order”
The “Sewer branch order” was used to describe the network topology [36,37]. Specifically, the
Strahler numbers (SN) were assigned to each pipe [36,38]. An example of SNs determination is given
in Figure 3. Based on the SNs, the system was hierarchically decomposed into a number of subsystems
labeled as PSN (i; Figure 3). The superscript SN refers to the level of decomposition. The index i refers
to the ID of each subsystem at the same level. Except the top level, all subsystems at each level were
comprised of pipes with SNs being equal to or smaller than the current level (SN) and a downstream
pipe at the higher level connected to them (as outlets). The sizes of those downstream pipes were
set to be “infinite” (e.g., >100 m). For the top level, the corresponding PSN was the whole drainage
system and the downstream pipe was the outlet pipe of the system. This methodology ensures that the
capacity of each corresponding subsystem is first designed to be just enough for delivering water to
downstream, since the back water effects from the downstream of any PSNs have been eliminated. Thus,
any further increase of the capacity later will be to provide the extra buffer capacity to accommodate
excess water from downstream.
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• Pipe Sizing
The pipe sizing was formulated as a single-objective optimal design problem, in which the
objective function was to minimize the pipe construction cost (Equation (1)) and the constraint was to
ensure the flood volume at each node is equal to zero (Equation (2)).
minimize Pipe Construction Cost =
np∑
i=1
Zi(di)Li (1)
s. .Flood volume at each node = 0 (2)
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where Zi(di) is the unit length cost ($/m) of candidate pipe diameter di (mm); np—the number of pipes;
and Li—the length of link i (m).
The optimization is carried out subsystem by subsystem following the hierarchical structure of
the studied network. Specifically, the method starts from optimizing the capacity of each subsystem at
the first level of decomposition (PSN = 1) until there was no flooding in all the subsystems (PSN = 1(1),...,
PSN = 1(5)). Subsequently, the same process would be repeated for the two subsystems PSN = 2(1) and
PSN = 2(2) at the second level, and then the PSN = 3. Within each subsystem, the automated pipe sizing
procedure is illustrated via a flowchart in Figure 4. Applying this strategy ensures the storage capacity
of the upstream subsystems to be maximized. As discussed above, no flooding in subsystems at the
current level of decomposition is the prerequisite for the next step. For this reason, if pipes in the PSN
= 1(1) are enlarged further during the optimization for PSN = 2(1), this means the capacity of PSN = 1(1) is
further increased to not only deal with the local flooding in its served region but also to accommodate
the excess flows from downstream due to the back water effect.Water 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 13 
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Within each level, for each subsystem the rehabilitation process (Figure 4) is described below:
(1) Identify the m st upstream flooding node: multiple flooding nodes may occur in the same
subsystem, and th process should start from the most upstream od (Figure 4).
(2) Select the upstr am pipes of the flooding node as candidate pipes for r habilitation.
(3) Locate the JS node. Here, a JS node refers to a node with the following two principles being
satisfied. First, the upstream pipe connected to a JS node had its capacity (Ca = actual depth/max.
depth) being equal to 1; second, the downstream pipe connected to that node had a larger size
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(max. depth) than the upstream pipe. This is to ensure that only pipes without enough capacity
are enlarged, and the upstream pipes are always preferable.
(4) Enlarge the upstream pipe of the JS node by one increment based on the used commercial
pipe sizes.
(5) Repeat Step (1)–(4) to relocate the most upstream flooding node and the JS node and repeat the
process. If no JS node exists (i.e., all candidate pipes have the same size), the most downstream
one before the infinite size pipe should be enlarged and next repeat Step (1)–(4).
In the application, the so-called “infinite size” should be defined with care based on trial-and-error.
On the one hand, it must be large enough to eliminate the backwater effects from the downstream PSN
(higher level) to the upstream PSN and the interactions between PSNs. On the other hand, it should not
be too large as to avoid computation errors.
2.1.2. Case study of Provision of Extra Capacity
A case study of a real-world storm sewer network (Example USER1) [39] is carried out to test the
method. The case study network serves for a 175 hectare drainage area, divided into 58 subcatchments.
The network layout is given in Figure 5A, in which there are 59 circular pipes connected to 59 junctions
and to a single outfall. The elevation profile of the trunks drops almost 19 meters over a distance of
2.5 km (see Figure 5B). Figure 5C describes the storm event used for the simulation. The system needs
rehabilitation as a total flood volume of 1935 m3 water occurred in a few nodes during the storm event.
The system was solved using the software SWMM Version 5.0022 with a 5 second flow routing time
step for a 7 hours duration with a 1 minute reporting time step. A package including the SWMM input
file of the UDS is provided in [39] and downloadable from the EPA’s Storm Water Management Model
(SWMM) website.Water 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 13 
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As for the case study, the method was implemented based on using the default pipe sizes specified
in the model as initial estimates. For a new layout, however, the initial pipe sizes could also be
determined by using the time area method. For the optimization of each subsystem, all pipes except
the one with infinite size were selected as decision variables. The values available for the decision
variables are listed in Table 1. Two design principles were imposed in this investigation, one allowing
surcharge (the multiscale concept) and the other not (consistent with the traditional design concept).
Table 1. Price list of reinforced concrete pipes [40].
Size (mm) Unit Mass (kg/m) Class 50-D 1 ($/m) Size (mm) Unit Mass (kg/m) Class 50-D 1 ($/m)
300 225 65.9 1350 1939 713.3
375 306 81.4 1500 2123 872.4
450 381 83.9 1650 2500 1044.70
525 470 91.5 1800 2865 1262.40
600 578 131.5 1950 3324 1464.10
675 691 201.6 2100 3807 1680.00
750 780 265.7 2250 4311 1909.30
825 912 308.3 2400 4869 2234.70
900 1039 369.8 2550 5179 2516.90
975 1195 405.7 2700 5752 2793.30
1050 1277 464.6 3000 7043 3420.60
1200 1561 582.3
1 The compressive strength that requires pipes ≤ 2400 mm to withstand 30 MPa loads and pipes > 2400 mm to
withstand 35 MPa loads [41].
2.2. Provision of Extra Connections
Extra connections allowing reverse flows can be added among subsystems to enable subsystems
to coordinate with each other during an exceptional event. This methodology is directly applicable in
WDSs that have already been decomposed into a number of districted metered areas (DMAs). Adding
the extra connections among DMAs allow the DMAs to support each other when any of them suffers
from water supply shortage. This idea is tested on the C-Town (Figure 6), a benchmarking real-world
WDS consisting of five DMAs [42]. Water is first pumped from a reservoir to DMA 1 and two tanks
connected to it, and then to four booster pump stations configured at the inlets of DMA 2–5 respectively.
Hence, all DMAs at scale 1 (DMA 2–5) can be feed by both the reservoir and tanks in DMA1 at scale 2 as
well as their own tank(s) and booster stations. However, the DMA1 at scale 2 cannot receive any supply
from any DMA at scale 1. This one-way coordination will be problematic, as in case the reservoir
is disconnected from the system due to connection failure (Figure 6C), DMA1 has to supply all the
system but cannot receive help from any other DMAs. In this regard, the effectiveness of allowing
other DMAs to feed DMA1 was tested. Specifically, in each booster pump station a by-pass pipe was
added, which will open to let water travelling backward when necessary (e.g., in a failure event needs
emergent coordination), allowing DMA1 (at scale 2) to receive water from any of the other DMAs (at
scale 1). Details of the four extra by-pass connections are listed in Table 2. The failure scenario of
loosing pipe P100 on the path from the reservoir to the system was simulated, by closing the pipe in
the EPANET model from the beginning of the simulation period. The demand shortage caused by the
failure was calculated as the actual supplied demand during the failure event minus the total demand
required. The actual supplied demand was a sum of actual nodal demands that is estimated based on
the minimum pressure required and a pressure-demand relationship specified in [43]. More details of
the demand shortage estimation method are available in [9,44]. The minimum pressure required was
20 meters for nodes with water demands and zero meters for junctions with no water demands.
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Table 2. Information of the four extra pipes.
Pipe ID Location Start Node End Node Length (m) Diameter (mm) Roughness(Hazen-Williams)
Ex1 Pump station S3 J415 J289 15 304.8 120
Ex2 Pump station S2 J256 J300 15 254 120
Ex3 Pump station S5 J323 J309 15 203.2 120
Ex4 Pump station S4 J304 J301 15 203.2 120
3. Results and Discussions
For the UDS, the comparison between traditional design and multiscale resilient design is shown
in Figure 7B. By referring to the original layout of the UDS (before the rehabilitation; Figure 7B), it can
be seen that the multiscale resilient design only increased sizes of some upstream pipes (with diameters
≤ 0.6 m), and all larger downstream pipes (with diameters > 0.6 m) remained unchanged. Nevertheless,
to accommodate the same volume of flood, the traditional design (with no surcharges and backwater
effects allowed) needs to increase sizes of most of pipes, including large downstream pipes close to the
outlet (e.g., the pipeline in orange color). Hence, the multiscale resilient design uses smaller pipes in
many locations in comparison with the traditional design, particularly for downstream pipes at large
scales. It thus achieves considerable cost saving (about 10%) and no loss in flood attenuation capacity
via multiscale coordination. By utilizing surcharges and backwater effects, the method enabled the
UDSs to store excess water during extreme events at proper locations and proper time. For example,
Figure 8 shows that during peak flow hours the two pipes highlighted in red boxes were able to
prevent water inside them to be discharged to downstream by using backwater effects (as reverse flow
directions were observed at time steps 50 min and 51 min, and 52 min, respectively). This temporary
storage ability, despite being needed for no more than 2 minutes (as Figure 8 shows), was sufficient to
attenuate peak flows to avoid floods from the UDS. The temporary storage also attenuated peak flows
discharged to receiving water bodies too, and thus prevented sharply rising of the water levels there to
avoid local flooding. The method was computationally efficient and deterministic as well. Regarding
the computation expense, the method was executed on a laptop computer configured with Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz 2.60 GHz, 4.00 GB RAM, and a 240 GB SSD hard drive. The total
computation time was only about 2.5 minutes. Compared with evolutionary optimization methods,
the method also had its considerable advantages, since it produced unique solutions at each run (no
randomness of solutions, i.e., deterministic), and did not require any parameter for configuration and
execution control.
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Figure 8. The locations and durations of using backwater effects to provide temporary storages in the
case study UDS during peak flow hours.
For the WDS, using any extra connection can prolong water supply in DMA1 with no significant
failure impacts, i.e., 1 hour by using the support from either DMA2 or 4, 2 hours by using DMA5, and
3 hours by using DMA3. Despite it also causes some regions in DMA2–4 to lose water supply, the
amount of water supply shortage is still slightly reduced over the whole system during the failure
event. Hence, the extra investment of adding the extra connections is worthwhile if carefully planned.
Further, opening all extra connections together will prolong water supply in DMA1 (with no significant
failure impacts) for as long as 5 hours, at the expense of significantly affecting water supplies at the
other DMAs. This option may not be worthwhile, compared with using a single extra connection in
DMA3 to gain a three hours extension. However, all these facts revealed will help decision markers in
planning of the coordination. For large and complex WDSs, locations of the connections would be
case-specific, and thus should be carefully selected. A generic method is yet to be developed in future
research, as this study’s scope is to first test the validity of the idea of using extra connections. It is
believed that the multiscale approach is complementary to the current practice of building loops in
WDSs that allows isolation of any main pipe break for repair work with little impact on customers
outside of that immediate area.
4. Conclusions
This study explored how to apply the concept of multiscale resilience into urban water systems,
and concluded as follows:
i i l i l i l ili , i i ll
fl , . ., ll l t rt l rger scales;
Water 2020, 12, 1521 10 of 12
• The proposed method for developing multiscale resilience was to provide extra capacities and/or
connections that not only allow water to travel from upstream to downstream (as the traditional
design does) but also allow reverse flow in the system during exceptional failure events (i.e., from
larger scales to smaller scales in UDS and vice verse in WDS).
• Case studies on a real world UDS and WDS verified: As for the UDS, enlarging smaller upstream
pipes provided buffer capacities to accommodate excess water travelling back from downstream
pipes due to surcharge and backwater effects. By allowing a temporary storage of storm water
for two minutes inside a few pipes, peak flows were attenuated and thus avoided flooding in
the system. The multiscale resilient design achieved considerable cost saving (about 10%) and
no loss in flood attenuation capacity via the multiscale coordination. For the WDS, using extra
connections that can direct flow from the smaller scale to larger scale provided flexibility in water
supply coordination (e.g., allowed subsystems at downstream to feed subsystems at upstream)
and reduced the total amount of water supply shortage in the system during a failure event of
losing the connection to the reservoir.
• Future work includes testing the methods on various real-world WDSs and UDSs, and meanwhile
further develop the methodology. Moreover, the methodology will be applied to analyze
interdependent systems of systems [45] as an outreach.
From a global perspective on the scientific-technical world, this study is an addition to the
important area of research to create a multiscale view of both a single complex system and
integrated complex systems to identify key interdependencies within the systems from their inherent
complexity. Interdependencies between these systems and their sub-systems have consequences for
the ways in which critical services are consumed and their resilience and improving decision making
toward sustainable consumption is essential for society, the environment and also the infrastructure
systems themselves.
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